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ABSTRACT
The article elaborates on the lack of objective guarantees of independence and
impartiality in the existing system of investment treaty arbitration. This founds a case
for an international investment court to replace the existing system. The argument
proceeds in three steps: (1) investment treaty arbitration is uniquely a form of public
law adjudication, constituted at the international level; (2) as constituted it does not
satisfy standards of independence and impartiality in public law adjudication; and (3)
various reasons that might be offered to justify this failing are unsatisfactory in light
of the importance of these standards. For this reason, states should be encouraged to
establish an international investment court in accordance with well-known principles
of judicial decision-making. Above all, alternatives to the existing system should be
measured against the criteria that typically apply in public law, especially the related
principles of openness and independence. Absent these criteria being met, one does
not have a system that depoliticizes disputes and subjects them to the rule of law, or
that warrants the utmost respect of all parties, above all developing states.

1

This article presents a case for an international investment court. It is a case and not
‘the case’ because the argument is presented relative to existing arrangements that use
a treaty-based arbitration mechanism to resolve investment disputes between states
and investors. The argument is also narrow in that it focuses on a central distinction
between judges and arbitrators: the secure tenure of the former and the insecure
tenure (case-by-case appointment) of the latter. This orientation of the argument
leads by implication to the assertion that there is something wanting in terms of the
independence and impartiality of arbitrators in the existing arrangements based on
investment treaty arbitration. Given this, the present case is meant to respond to a
critical flaw in an existing arrangement for international adjudication by elaborating
upon an alternative.
It should be made clear from the outset that apparent bias in investment treaty
arbitration is just that: it is a reasonable suspicion of bias (not actual bias) arising from
structural failings of arbitration when used to determine matters of public law. The
critique of investment treaty arbitration should thus not be taken as a condemnation
of anyone involved in investment arbitration; there are many jurists, lawyers,
academics, and business people of skill and integrity who sit as arbitrators and whose
reputation is not sullied by an objective critique of the structure of the system and, in
particular, its lack of objective guarantees of independence and impartiality. The
difficulty is that the current structure of investment treaty arbitration casts a pall over
all awards, and all legal interpretations, that emerge from the system in spite of the
experience, qualifications, integrity, etc of the arbitrators, for reasons quite unique to
this system and not to others where arbitration is used.
Ultimately it does not have to be this way. There are alternatives that are superior in
their guarantees of impartiality and independence and that can be achieved without
legal or intellectual acrobatics, with benefits for most if not all of the actors involved
including states and their governments, including investors (except perhaps for those
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investors for whom litigation is a business strategy in itself), and including other
systems that rely properly on arbitration to resolve disputes, especially commercial
arbitration. The clearest alternative to the present arrangement is to establish an
international investment court.
The broad outline of the argument presented here in favour of such a court is as
follows. First, investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication in
which the meaning of public law is resolved finally by adjudication. Second, for this
reason, it should be evaluated according to standards that apply historically in public
law. Third, the current system’s failure to satisfy these standards, especially security of
tenure, calls for an institutional arrangement that does satisfy them. Lastly, various
counter-arguments that have been offered or that might be offered in opposition to
an international investment court, founded on the principle of security of tenure in
public law adjudication, do not warrant maintaining investment treaty arbitration as
an alternative to such a court. For this reason, states should be encouraged to
establish an international investment court in accordance with well-known principles
of judicial decision-making in public law.
A

Underlying assumptions

The case presented here borrows and elaborates on arguments presented elsewhere
by the author1 and it remains grounded in the theoretical distinction between the use
of arbitration to resolve regulatory disputes and its use to resolve commercial or
other private disputes. There are powerful criticisms of public-private distinctions
from various perspectives and the aim here is not to dismiss these, although in this
paper the criticisms are not discussed in detail if at all. Rather, the aim here is to use
the public-private distinction to elucidate specific differences in casting the major
types of adjudication, while acknowledging the possibility that the distinction may
G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) ch 7
especially.

1
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leave gray areas or be simply inappropriate in some circumstances. Nevertheless, it is
assumed that these limitations are not so pervasive or frequent in the present context
as to defeat the underlying usefulness of the distinction.
The public-private distinction rests in turn on a concept of the state as sovereign.
This concept too has received some negative press of late. The argument here is again
quite pragmatic in its orientation. It refers to sovereignty as an instrument for
identifying and analyzing certain activities of states as activities that states alone are
able to engage in; for example, the passage of general rules accepted as binding in
society and ultimately enforceable by the state’s coercive power. Recognizing this
uniqueness of the state as sovereign, arising from its role as the representative of a
political group associated with a particular territory, is useful in that it helps to reveal
the distinctiveness of the relationship between the state and those who are subjected
to or affected by regulatory activity of the state. As a concept, sovereignty is a means
of social ordering that is important (though of course not beyond challenge or doubt)
and that has sufficient probative value here, it is suggested, to enable an elaboration
of the sorts of disputes that arise between investors and states and how those
disputes differ from disputes arising between parties that are equally capable of
possessing legal rights and obligations.
In particular, an important aspect of disputes arising between a sovereign state and a
foreign investor is that they are one-sided in that the entity on one side, the state, has
a different set of powers and obligations in law than the entity on the other side, the
investor. In some respects the state will possess rights that private parties cannot hold
such that the state will have powers that are specifically sovereign. In other respects
the state may be bound by sovereign obligations that a private party cannot possess
or that a private party is in a unique position legally to avoid or abbreviate (by for
example declaring bankruptcy). Where a dispute between a state and a private party
occurs in relation to the state’s exercise of these uniquely sovereign powers or its
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assumption of uniquely sovereign obligations, the dispute is described here as a
‘regulatory dispute’ and the adjudication of that dispute as a form of ‘public law
adjudication’.
Thus, for present purposes, the public-private distinction entails recognition of the
state as an entity with unique characteristics and of this concept of the state as the
basis for public law as a category of study, enabling (even if roughly or with doubt) a
distinction between instances in which adjudication is used to resolve regulatory
disputes and instance in which it is used to resolve disputes originating in a reciprocal
relationship between juridical equals.
B

Argument

1

Investment treaty arbitration as a form of public law adjudication

In applying this conceptual framework to investment treaty arbitration, the author
has argued elsewhere (and will again only summarize that argument here) that
investment treaty arbitration is a public law system, uniquely constituted at the
international level, which replicates the structure of judicial review in domestic public
law to a greater degree than other forms of international adjudication. In this respect,
there is a key conceptual difference between investment treaty arbitration on the one
hand and international commercial arbitration or conventional inter-state adjudication
in public international law on the other. Both latter forms of international
adjudication – international commercial arbitration and inter-state adjudication – are
used to resolve disputes arising from a reciprocal legal relationship between the
parties; that is, in international commercial arbitration, between private parties (one of
which may be a state, acting in a private capacity) and in public international law
between states (both acting in a sovereign capacity). In both contexts, either disputing
party is equally capable of bringing a claim and of possessing legal rights and
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obligations; hence the underlying formal reciprocity. In the case of investment treaty
arbitration, on the other hand, adjudication is used to resolve disputes arising
between an individual and a state in relation to that state’s assertion of its unique
authority to regulate. The disputes arise in the context of a regulatory, rather than a
reciprocal, legal relationship defined as such by the idea that the state in some cases
exercises authority that no private party can possess.
For this reason, investment treaty arbitration is best analogized to judicial review in
public law because it involves an adjudicative body having the competence to
determine, in response to a claim by an individual, the legality of the use of sovereign
authority, and to award a remedy for unlawful state conduct. Alternatively, it could be
said that the adjudicative body issues a decision that has important consequences for
the state, for the individual, and for others affected by what the decision means for
the authority and conduct of the state, whether they are affected as taxpayers,
employees, consumers, recipients of government programs, beneficiaries of
regulation, and so on.
The public law character of investment treaty arbitration can be highlighted by
looking at some of the questions that arbitrators have been called upon to answer in
claims under investment treaties. For instance, they have determined whether a state
violated a legal standard in an investment treaty by its national legislature enacting
legislation that re-valued the state’s official currency, by a judge of that state
conducting a trial in a particular way, by its executive interpreting its tax laws or
issuing a broadcasting license or determining an export quota. It is not necessary to
examine the details of cases in which these questions arose or how they were
resolved. The point is simply that, in terms of the legal questions at stake and the
wider consequences for the community or society, these claims resemble the claims
that are commonly resolved in the domestic sphere by way of constitutional or
administrative law. That is, investment treaty arbitration is used to resolve regulatory
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disputes between those who govern and those who are governed. It is not used to
resolve disputes arising from contractual or other reciprocal legal relations between
private parties, one of which might very well be a state, but a state that is acting in a
non-sovereign capacity.
The next step in the argument that investment treaty arbitration is a form of public
law adjudication requires that it be distinguished from other instances where
international adjudication is used to resolve claims involving the sovereign treatment
of an individual by the state. Here, the uniqueness of investment treaty arbitration
arises from its exceptional combination of five characteristics (which again are only
summarized here). First, unlike in customary international law and the great majority
of treaties, individuals are authorized to bring international claims against states in the
context of the regulatory relationship, as opposed to a commercial relationship, with
the respondent state.
Second, the state’s consent to arbitration is prospective, unlike in the case of those
international tribunals where individuals historically could bring claims, such as the
Iran-US Claims Tribunal or historical claims tribunals formed after the Second World
War (tribunals whose competence was limited either to existing disputes or to
disputes arising from a particular historical event, such as a war or revolution).
Third, the primary remedy in investment treaty arbitration is a damages award against
the state. As such, investment treaties establish a system of state liability in public law;
indeed, they provide for damages awards against the state for acts of not only the
domestic administration of the state but also its legislatures and its courts. The
availability of this remedy distinguishes investment treaty arbitration from other
forms of international adjudication that allow individual claims with the exception of
a small number of international courts, including the European Court of Justice, the
European Court of Human Rights, and with certain qualifications the Inter-American
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Court of Human Rights. In public law, the damages award for past unlawful conduct
of the state is a very significant remedy because of its implications both for the
budgets of states and for governmental decision-making writ large.
Fourth, unlike any other treaty, investment treaties often remove the duty of the
individual to exhaust local remedies before an international claim can be brought.
This is critical because it operates to eclipse the conventional role of the domestic
legal system in mediating between the international and domestic spheres. Further,
this removal of the duty to exhaust local remedies is entirely unique to investment
treaty arbitration. It is perhaps the most important aspect of how investment treaty
arbitration, unlike other forms of international adjudication, resembles so closely
domestic public law.
Fifth, unlike other decisions or awards in public law, investment treaty awards are
enforceable in the courts of as many as 160 countries with limited opportunity for
judicial review, in particular for errors of law or unreasonable choices made by the
arbitrators (ie, other than jurisdictional errors or serious procedural impropriety). As a
result, the arbitrators are authorized to interpret important questions of public law
without the possibility of review or correction by a court, whether domestic or
international.
The combination of these elements distinguishes investment treaty arbitration from
other forms of international adjudication. It is therefore accurate in my view to say
that investment treaty arbitration is the closest the world has come to an international
adjudicative body with compulsory jurisdiction over claims by individual against
states in the regulatory sphere. That is, it is the closest we have come to an
international constitutional or administrative court, if we understand such a body to
be one that would allow individuals directly to initiate an adjudicative review of the
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regulatory conduct of the state, and to obtain a binding determination of the legality
of state conduct as well as a powerful remedy.
But of course investment treaty arbitration is not a court at all. It is rather a system
that relies on a private model of adjudication, arbitration, to resolve regulatory
disputes arising from foreign ownership of assets.
2

Independence and impartiality in public law adjudication

The argument thus far has sought to identify investment treaty arbitration as a form
of state-to-individual adjudication in the regulatory context and, in this respect, as
something unlike international commercial arbitration or other forms of international
adjudication in public international law. Accepting that investment treaty arbitration is
a form of public law adjudication, it is appropriate to examine issues of independence
and impartiality in the system against the relevant standards that apply in public law,
and not in these other contexts of international adjudication. In doing so, one should
begin with standards that normally apply to courts in public law. This is the focus of
the second stage of the argument.
Normally, in public law, the adjudicative review of the state as the ultimate legislature
and regulator on behalf of its people is reserved for a distinct branch of government
called courts. Why a distinct branch? The primary reason historically was to separate
the judicial function, involving the interpretation and application of the law in specific
cases, from other branches of government. To achieve this separation it was thought
necessary to ensure certain guarantees of independence for the judge, including by
appointing the judge for set term; barring his or her removal from office other than
for cause; guaranteeing the judge’s salary; and ensuring certain guarantees of
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administrative independence involving the control by a court of its docket, the
assignment of judges to cases, and so on.2
In the common law tradition, the security of tenure of judges is ‘an original principle
in the basic customary law of the constitution’.3 It has well-established roots dating
from England’s Act of Settlement 1701 which provided that judges could be removed
no longer at the pleasure of the King, but only on the approval of both Houses of
Parliament.4 This statute was an outcome of the Glorious Revolution, following the
stands taken by Sir Edward Coke as Chief Justice to King James I and, in particular,
his refusal to subject judicial decisions to overriding authority of the King (a stand for
which he was dismissed by the King). The principle of security of tenure for judges of
the realm, as enacted into law by the Act of Settlement, was in turn incorporated into
the constitutions of the United States and other countries, including Canada, as a
basis for separating the judicial function of the state from, especially, the executive
function.
In the US context, Alexander Hamilton spoke in the Federalist Papers of the
incorporation of security of tenure in the American Constitution in these terms:5
As liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments; …
[permanence in office] may therefore be regarded as an indispensable
ingredient in its constitution, and, in great measure, as the citadel of the public
justice and the public security.
Hamilton wrote further of the ‘permanent tenure of judicial officers’ that ‘nothing
will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be
2 NT Nemetz, ‘Comment’ in A Linden, ed, The Canadian Judiciary (Osgoode Hall Law School 1976)
16-17.
3 WR Lederman, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’ in A Linden, ed, The Canadian Judiciary
(Osgoode Hall Law School 1976) 5.
4 Lord Denning, ‘The Independence of the Judges’ (Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club of
the University of Birmingham, 1949-50) 7-8.
5 The Federalist Papers, no 78 (New American Library edn, 1961) 465-6.
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essentially to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty’.6 Here, permanency of
tenure concerned chiefly judges’ ‘duration in office, the provisions for their support,
the precautions for their responsibility.’7
The origins of judicial security of tenure thus lie in the separation of judicial power
from that of the executive. Regarding this, it is important in today’s context not to
limit oneself to domestic executive officials, but also to consider the prospect that
international executives might likewise exercise power over international adjudicators
in ways that call into question their independence and impartiality. Further, the power
of private interests is also of concern, to the extent that such interests might also be
in a position to wield inappropriate influence over the adjudicator or the adjudicative
process in its determination of what the state is, what it is allowed to do in law, and
what happens when the sovereign state is found to have done something unlawful.
As Shimon Shetreet wrote in 1976:8
Independence of the judiciary has normally been thought of as freedom from
interference by the executive or legislature in the exercise of the judicial
function…. In modern times, with the steady growth of corporate giants, it is
of utmost importance that the independence of the judiciary from business or
corporate interests should also be secured. In short, independence of the
judiciary implies not only that a judge be free from governmental and political
pressure and political entanglement but also that he should be removed from
financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather to seem to
affect him in the exercise of his judicial function.
i

Perceived versus actual bias

How do those principles of judicial decision-making apply to investment treaty
arbitration? In the first place, it is important to clarify that our concern is not merely
actual bias but also the perception of bias on the part of the individual adjudicator or

ibid, 469.
ibid, 465.
8 S Shetreet, Judges on Trial (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1976) 17-18.
6
7
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adjudicative body. I draw attention to this only because it has been said that, without
proof of actual bias or an actual conflict of interest on the part of an arbitrator, there
is no problem with the current system of investment treaty arbitration. To insist on
proof actual bias, however, entails a diminished standard of impartiality and
independence, not only in the context of public law, but also in other contexts where
arbitration is commonly utilized to resolve disputes. For all forms of adjudication, if
we consider this a process by which a neutral authority that is not under the sway of
one of the dispute parties, one speaks in terms of the absence of any ‘apprehension’
of bias, or any ‘appearance’ or ‘suspicion’ or ‘danger’ of bias, in order simply to make
the point is that the concern for fairness and justice goes beyond actual bias and is
measurable in terms of perceptions, based either on an objective standard or on
subjective views of the parties themselves.
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales put it thus in the Locabail decision:9
…. objections and applications based on what, in the case law, is called ‘actual
bias’ are very rare, partly (as we trust) because the existence of actual bias is
very rare, but partly for other reasons also. The proof of actual bias is very
difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge
about extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common
law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a
real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias actually
exists.
So there are good reasons for not limiting the evaluation to proof of actual bias on
the part of an adjudicator. First, it would be unreasonable to hold a party to a
requirement to prove actual bias given the difficulties in doing so. Second, it would
be unbecoming of the adjudicative process to require the adjudicator to testify in
advance as to his or her state of mind, opinions, etc. Instead, one speaks of the
perception of bias. In Lord Hewart’s famous formulation: ‘it is not merely of some
importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done,
9

Locabail v Bayfield Properties [2000] QB 451, 471-2.
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but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.10 Or, according to the
Supreme Court of Canada, it is required ‘that the court or tribunal be reasonably
perceived as independent’:11
The reason for this additional requirement was that the guarantee of judicial
independence has the goal not only of ensuring that justice is done in
individual cases, but also of ensuring public confidence in the justice system....
Also according to the Supreme Court of Canada:12
Without that confidence the system cannot command the respect and
acceptance that are essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore,
important that a tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as
impartial, and that the test for independence should include that perception.
Now, in assessing whether there is a reasonable perception of independence, it is
necessary to look for any indicators of possible bias or lack of independence that are
specific to the individual adjudicator, whether judge or arbitrator. That is, is there a
direct or indirect interest that raises a concern in light of the personal or professional
connections of the individual adjudicator? Is there an attitudinal bias arising from
what the adjudicator has written on matters relevant to the dispute before him or her?
Has the adjudicator been involved in past in the dispute or the line of decisionmaking in question? Or has some conduct of the individual such as antagonism
toward a party during a hearing raised a perception of a predisposition as to the
result?
In the context of arbitration, these issues are often addressed in arbitrators’ codes of
conduct or in the rules of arbitration, and they inform the sorts of arguments that
one sees arising in investment treaty arbitrations where a state has challenged the
appointment of an arbitrator on the basis of an apparent conflict of interest. Such
The King v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256, 259.
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, [1997] 3 SCR 3, para 111-12.
12 R v Valente, [1985] 2 SCR 673, para 22.
10
11
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challenges have arisen from the role of the arbitrator as a counsel in other cases, from
past advocacy of the arbitrator in matters related to the dispute at hand, from
previous decisions of the arbitrator, and from statements made by the arbitrator at
the hearing.
For example, Poland challenged the appointment of former ICJ justice Steven
Schwebel in the Eureko arbitration based on (1) his working relationship with the firm
Sidney Austin whose lawyers were advancing a separate investment treaty arbitration
against Poland and (2) his own role as counsel (via links to same firm) for an investor
in an investment treaty arbitration against another state, Argentina, in the Vivendi case
and the fact that his arguments in that case relied in part on decisions made by the
Eureko tribunal of which he was a member. Argument (1) was rejected by the Belgian
Court of First Instance, whose decision was upheld by the Belgian Court of Appeal,
in its application of provisions under the Belgian Judicial Code that allow for a
challenge to an arbitrator’s appointment when circumstance raise ‘legitimate doubts’
about his or her impartiality or independence. Argument (2) was also rejected by the
Belgian Court of Appeal, although on the separate basis that the argument had not
been raised by Poland before the Court of First Instance. The court also reportedly
emphasized Mr. Schwebel’s professional integrity as outweighing his sensibility and
the goals he pursues as counsel or the possibility that his work as counsel and his
working relationships with other counsel might influence inappropriately the
decisions he makes as an arbitrator.13
Another example is Argentina’s challenge in the British Gas arbitration to the
appointment of Professor van den Berg on the basis of his past participation in other
tribunals that had reached different interpretations of Argentina’s arguments about

C Verbruggen, ‘Belgian Court Confirms Independence of Judge Schwebel’ International Arbitration
Newsletter (11 February 2008); D Vis-Dunbar and LE Peterson, ‘Belgian Appeals Court rejects
Poland’s challenge to Arbitrator in Eureko case’ Investment Treaty News (15 November 2007)
www.investmenttreatynews.com.
13
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the meaning of the state of necessity under its bilateral investment treaty with the US
and in customary international law. This challenge was referred to the International
Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, which rejected the
challenge without providing reasons for its decision (as is the ICC’s practice). This
decision is reportedly subject to a further challenge by Argentina in the Argentine
courts, based in part on the ICC not having given reasons for its decision. Further, in
the National Grid arbitration, Argentina challenged the appointment of an arbitrator,
Dr Andres Rigo Sureda, as president of the tribunal on the basis that his then law
firm had appointed Dr Guido Tawil as an arbitrator in an arbitration between Duke
Energy and Peru, and that Dr Tawil served concurrently as counsel in two other
investment treaty cases against Argentina over which Dr Rigo Sureda had presided.
Thus, the concern was that Dr Sureda would be sitting in judgment of a client of Dr
Tawil, while Dr Tawil was sitting in judgment of a client of Dr Riga Sureda’s law firm.
This challenge was also rejected without reasons by the ICC International Court of
Arbitration, which had been designated to hear the challenge by the appointing
authority for the arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
There have been other challenges to the appointment of arbitrators. With one
exception,14 they have not succeeded to my knowledge (although some are still
pending) and it is not suggested here that any of them should have succeeded in any
particular case. The point here is simply that this is an area of inquiry, applicable to
courts and to arbitration tribunals, that concerns matters of perceived bias; the
common question is whether there is some characteristic of the individual adjudicator
that raises concerns.

Republic of Ghana v Telekom Malaysia Berhad (18 October 2004 and 5 November 2004, No HA/RK
2004.667 and HA/RK 2004.788) (DC The Hague) (concluding that a party-nominated arbitrator in
an investment arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules could not concurrently act as counsel to an
unrelated party in an ICSID annulment proceeding that raised similar legal issues).
14
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ii

Objective guarantees of independence

This concern for an absence of any unacceptable perception – keeping in mind of
course that the threshold for what is acceptable and what is not will vary in different
adjudicative contexts – is thus common to most if not all forms of adjudication. On
the other hand, what one does not see in arbitration, but what one should see where
adjudication is used finally to determine public law, is the existence of the objective
guarantees of independence that normally apply to courts. One of these guarantees is
security of tenure, but as mentioned there are others relating to the remuneration of
judges, their administrative independence, the openness of judicial proceedings, and
so on. They are what the Supreme Court of Canada has referred to as: ‘a set of
“objective conditions or guarantees”... whose absence would lead to a finding that a
tribunal or court was not independent. The existence of objective guarantees, of
course, follows from the fact that independence is status oriented; the objective
guarantees define that status.’15
These objective guarantees are absent, obviously, from arbitration where the
arbitrator is appointed on a case by case basis. Arbitrators who are appointed on a
case by case basis by definition do not have security of tenure. But is this really a
concern? If one holds investment treaty arbitration to the established standards of
judicial independence and impartiality in public law then the answer is yes, because
the absence of security of tenure leads to a reasonable judgment that the system is
stacked, to put it crudely, in favour of investors and against host states. Undoubtedly,
in any adjudicative system, parties on both sides will sometimes claim that they lost
unjustifiably and that they did not get a fair hearing. However, uniquely in the case of
the present system because of its use of arbitration in public law, a perception of bias
does operate structurally in favour of investors and against states and those on whose
behalf states act.
15

Reference re Remuneration, above n 11, para 112 (referencing Valente, above n 12, para 15 and 22).
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There are two elements to this. The first has to do with the designation under
investment treaties of appointing authorities for arbitrators. Without security of
tenure for the adjudicator, the entity that has the ultimate power to appoint in each
case, after a claim has been filed, has much greater ability to influence the adjudicative
process than if it only appointed the adjudicator once and for a set term. In a case by
case system, the appointing authority has the power to choose the presiding
arbitrator, in the absence of agreement between the state and individual, after
examining in each instance the dispute at hand, the nationality of the claimant, the
identify of the host state, and so on. Under investment treaties, this power is allocated
to decision-makers that cannot be said to be reasonably free from bias in favour of
foreign investors or, on the other hand, states. Rather, the institutions in question
lean heavily toward the capital-exporting perspective and, by extension, toward
foreign investors and the major capital-exporting states.
First, appointing authority is commonly exercised by the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes where appointing authority is exercised either by
the Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council or by the ICSID Secretary General.
The former is an ex officio position of the President of the World Bank who is in turn
nominated by the US government and confirmed by the Bank’s Board of Directors
(where over 60% of the voting power is exercised by Executive Directors from 11
major capital-exporting states); at present, this appointing authority is exercised by
Robert Zoellick (formerly US Trade Representative); before that it was exercised by
Paul Wolfowitz (formerly US Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2001-2005). Likewise, the
ICSID Secretary General (customarily also the World Bank’s Legal VP and General
Counsel, although this customary practice is now reportedly slated to change16) is a
person nominated by the Chair of the Administrative Council and approved by a
two-thirds vote of the Administrative Council. In both cases, then, appointing
16

‘After 40+ years, ICSID to have its own full-time Secretary General’ Investment Arbitration Reporter
(18 June 2008) www.iareporter.com.
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authority is vested in an official who is customarily chosen by the US Administration
with the concurrence of other major capital-exporting states. As such, the system is
somewhat comparable to earlier arrangements in investment contracts between US
firms and Caribbean or Central American states, where disputes arising under the
contract between the US investor and the host government were subject to resolution
by arbitration, with default authority to appoint the presiding arbitrator resting with
the US Secretary of State.17 At ICSID, the role of the US Administration is one or
two steps removed from this quasi-colonial set-up in that the US Administration
nominates the World Bank President – subject to appointment by a process in which
11 major capital-exporters hold a majority of the votes – who will then either exercise
appointing authority or in turn select the ICSID Secretary General to do so. Given
this structure, it seems reasonable for an informed observer to conclude that ICSID
appointing authority will tend toward the position of the major capital-exporting
states and their firms. Put differently, it is difficult to say that those who wield
appointing authority at ICSID are free of a perception of bias in favour of investors,
especially US investors. Indeed, some developing states have gone so far as to
publicly challenged this proposition.18
Even so, this arrangement would be less problematic if ICSID appointed individual
adjudicators for a set term of, say, seven years; if the appointments were nonrenewable; if the adjudicators were chosen for particular cases in a neutral way, such
as by lottery; and if the appointments process took place as part of a public process
involving a discussion of potential candidates by different groups of states and an
opportunity for capital-exporting and capital-importing states both to influence the
final decision. There would need to be more say given to the capital-exporting
perspective than country-by-country or population-based voting would allow, if the
17

RW Dunn, American Foreign Investments (New York: BW Huebsch and Viking Press, 1926) 357-8,
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F Cabrera Diaz, ‘Bolivia expounds on reasons for withdrawing from ICSID arbitration system’
Investment Treaty News (27 May 2007); G Molina, ‘Ecuador wary of World Bank arbitration in
Occidental case’ The Washington Post (11 May 2008).
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aim was to establish a system that had the confidence of investors. But it need not be
a matter of control, as in the case of voting power among the World Bank’s
Executive Directors. At the very least, the guarantee of secure tenure would remove
the ongoing discretion that ICSID officials exercise over states on a claim-by-claim,
government-by-government basis.
Yet more troubling than the role of ICSID as appointing authority is the role under
some investment treaties of business organizations that are accountable directly to
investors and businesses. For example, some treaties (concluded mainly between
European states and developing states) assign appointing authority to the
International Chamber of Commerce (others assign it to the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce). Under the ICC Rules, arbitrators are appointed by the ICC’s
International Court of Arbitration, the members of which are nominated by the ICC
world council of business on the recommendation of the ICC Executive Board.19 On
its website, the ICC describes itself as ‘the world business organization’, as ‘the voice
of world business’, and as an organization that ‘speaks for world business whenever
governments make decisions that crucially affect corporate strategies and the bottom
line’. This conveys simply the point that the ICC is an association of businesses that
represents the interests of its members, many of whom are foreign investors, and that
can therefore be reasonably regarded as disposed more toward the business interests
of investors than the regulatory priorities of states.
Indeed, it seems far-fetched to suggest that a business organization (or an
adjudicative body the members of which are appointed by a business organization)
can serve as a neutral appointing authority, where it has the authority to appoint
arbitrators to resolve regulatory disputes between states and business. It is doubtful
that such an arrangement would ever be accepted in a domestic context. Can one
imagine a claim of ‘unfair regulation’, brought by a company, being submitted for
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 January 1998, art 1 and 9(3)) and
app I (Statute of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, art 3).
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resolution by an ad hoc tribunal, the president of which was appointed by the local
chamber of commerce? Not if one expected the claim to be resolved in a way that
was regarded as credible by outsiders. Such an arrangement would appear rather as
one meant to favour the business interest at the expense of genuine independence
and impartiality.
The second element of this question of impartiality and independence – beyond the
role of the appointing authority – is that security of tenure also insulates the
adjudicator from influence by powerful private interests, so as to ensure that no one
can say that the judge was predisposed to decide a case or interpreted the law in a way
that would increase his or her prospects for future income and career advancement.
Here it can be said (even where it is not the case) that arbitrators may be seen to
interpret the treaties in ways that encourage claims by investors and, in turn, allows
the relevant arbitration industry to thrive. That concern is unique to investment treaty
arbitration, where the private model of arbitration is imported into the realm of
public law, because only one class of parties (here the investor) activates the system
by bringing a claim under the treaty.
WR Lederman wrote in 1976 that with the security of tenure of judges, ‘The
conditions on which they hold office mean that they have no personal career interest
to be served by the way they go in deciding cases that come before them.’20 This
removal of the career interest from the adjudicative equation is defeated when one
assigns appointing authority on a case by case basis to executive officials; in the
words of Lord Denning, without security of tenure, ‘The judicial power is simply a
part of the executive machine’.21 It is likewise defeated when security of tenure is
removed in a one-way system in which only one class of disputing parties triggers use
of the system.
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Thus, to retrace our steps, the underlying distinction between regulatory and
reciprocal legal relationships is important because it suggests that public law disputes,
and especially matters of law arising from such disputes, should not be left ultimately
to arbitrators to resolve. Rather, they should be subject to the overarching authority
of public courts, defined among other things by their presumptive openness and by
objective guarantees of their independence and impartiality, in order to guard against
the suspicion that the adjudicator has been swayed in their judgments by the power
that others hold over his or her income and career. The argument is grounded in the
importance of security of tenure to the evolution of an adjudicative system that can
earn the utmost respect by all those whose rights or interests are engaged, above all
those who are directly subject to its authority and who may be affected detrimentally
by its outcomes.
3

Reply to counter-arguments

Certain counter-arguments have been advanced, and others may be anticipated, to
this case for an international investment court. Most commonly in my experience it
has been argued that there is no proof of actual bias in investment treaty arbitration
and therefore no problem with the current system. Absent evidence or some case of
actual bias, it is said, the requirements of independence and impartiality are satisfied.
This counter-argument rests on a misconception not only of the standards of
independence and impartiality that apply to judging in public law, but also of those
that apply in other adjudicative contexts, including commercial arbitration.22 As
discussed above, it is not usually a requirement in adjudication that actual bias be
shown in order to disqualify an adjudicator from a particular case (although proof of
eg IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (22 May 2004), explanation
to General Standard 1 (referring to ‘justifiable doubts’ as to the arbitrator’s ‘ability to be impartial or
independent’).
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actual bias will of course suffice to disqualify). What is required is a showing of some
reason for why the adjudicator may be reasonably perceived to lack independence
and impartiality, even though he or she may well be capable of resolving the case in
an independent way. Where one draws the line as to what perceptions constitute a
sufficient reason to disqualify the adjudicator or adjudicative arrangement will vary
according to the role and purpose of the adjudication. But only a very limited (and
probably unfair) system of adjudication would insist on proof of actual bias as the
sole check against impartiality and lack of independence.
Alternatively, it has been argued in response to this case for an international
investment court that security of tenure is unimportant, ‘artificial’, or at least not
central to ensuring impartiality and independence in public law adjudication. One
who has great trust in the integrity of individual arbitrators may well hold this belief,
and understandably. But not everyone is in a position to know enough about the
integrity of the individual adjudicator in one case or another to be assured that his or
her reputation is beyond doubt, especially when one learns of the business interest
that inevitably arises where an adjudicator lacks secure tenure and can obtain
appointment only case-by-case. This is why objective guarantees become so
important. It should also be emphasized that those who dismiss security of tenure as
a source of judicial independence are implicitly rejecting a long history of developed
wisdom on the issue, and should be called on to elaborate clear arguments to explain
why the inherited position is no longer thought important or relevant in investment
treaty arbitration. No one has done so to my knowledge. The author prefers therefore
to ride the coattails of Alexander Hamilton and company, and defend judicial security
of tenure.
One might alternatively concede that standards of independence and impartiality
normally present in public law are diluted in investment treaty arbitration, but that
this is appropriate for some reason. For example, it might be said that the fact that
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investment disputes exist on the international plane makes it somehow inappropriate
or unfeasible to import domestic ideals of judicial independence into that vaunted
realm. States would never agree to it, one might lament, and investment treaty
arbitration is the next-best alternative to the imperfections of domestic courts.
There are two problems with this counter-argument. The first is that states have
regularly given tenure to international adjudicators in both state-state disputes23 and
(however rare) individual-state disputes.24 They have also managed in many cases to
appoint highly reputed individuals as jurists to the relevant adjudicative bodies. Why
not encourage states to do the same in the present context of international
investment disputes? Second, the argument falters perhaps in its preference for
international arbitration over domestic courts if one accepts that the latter are in
certain respects more capable than the former to deliver fair and legitimate decisions
in the resolution of claims by foreign investors against host states. To adopt the
presumption, as do many investment treaties by removing the duty to exhaust local
remedies, that host state courts should be dismissed as simply incapable of delivering
justice to foreign investors fails to account for claims brought against states like
Canada and the United States, whose judiciaries have a status of constitutionalized
independence that is much superior to that of international arbitrators. Further, it
does not retain a space into which a state that successfully strengthens the capacity
and independence (including by ensuring security of tenure and other objective
guarantees) of its courts, as part of the state’s democratic progress or transition, may
position itself.
A more hopeful and in some cases more defensible option would be to adopt the
presumption, as does customary international law, that local courts offer justice and

eg International Court of Justice, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Appellate Body of
the World Trade Organization.
24 eg European Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, International Criminal Court, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
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to require the foreign investor to show otherwise as a precondition of an investment
treaty claim (or perhaps to reverse the presumption by at least allowing the host state
to defend itself against a treaty claim by establishing the independence of its courts).
Where the duty to exhaust local remedies is removed, the preference for international
arbitration operates not only as a mechanism to address failings of domestic courts
but also as a means to privilege foreign investors by allowing them to evade judicial
authority in public law, no matter how independent and capable of delivering justice
the courts may be. Lastly, even if the duty to exhaust local remedies is removed, the
more appropriate alternative to domestic courts – if one’s aim is to limit political
control over the resolution of investment disputes and subject them instead to the
rule of law – is patently an international investment court, not a system based on
case-by-case adjudicative appointment by executive or private business officials in a
regulatory context that encourages arbitrators to adopt interpretations in favour of
investors so as to encourage future claims.
Another counter-argument might be to point to administrative or quasi-judicial
tribunals at the domestic level that are staffed by adjudicators who do not have secure
tenure, but that resolve claims brought by individuals against the state in response to
legislative or executive decisions. In domestic administrative law, it is sometimes said
that judicial standards of independence must be moderated in order to facilitate the
fair and expeditious adjudication of disputes about individual interests in the modern
administrative state. That is, the state is simply so vast and complex that the
machinery of government would seize up if all governmental decisions that affected
an individual were subject to review by a fully independent court.
The author should confess that he is one who tends to emphasize the importance of
maintaining conventional standards of judicial independence as much as possible, and
of funding the courts accordingly, when dealing with even highly specific decisions of
governments that affect an individual in a particularized way. Yet there is no need to

24

invoke Dicey in order to distinguish the context of domestic tribunals in the modern
administrative state from that of investment treaty arbitration. First, with the latter,
one is not confronted with a flood of disputes that would overload the capacity of an
international court. At present, the rate of claims brought under investment treaties is
stable at a few dozen a year. It is not a case of the hundreds or thousands (or tens of
thousands) of claims annually that domestic tribunals are often established to deal
with. Also, states can surely afford the financial cost of an adjudicative body that
satisfies judicial standards, or work creatively toward a funding mechanism that
requires financial contributions by the disputing parties if that is thought prudent.
Presumably, the priority is not to save several tens of millions of dollars a year, but to
establish a system that is widely regarded as fair and independent, in the longer term
interest of the system and those whom it seeks to protect.
Second, one is not dealing in investment treaty arbitration with the sorts of questions
that are allocated to administrative tribunals in domestic law. The disputes at stake do
not involve the removal of a liquor license or the disciplining of a lawyer or a doctor.
Rather, they very often address the legality of legislative acts or broad policy decisions
of government, leading to the potential re-allocation of substantial public funds to
private business. These questions are of a different order of significance from those
usually resolved by domestic tribunals. It is also noteworthy that domestic tribunals,
even when they handle large numbers of claims, are often staffed by members who
have a set tenure and who are not assigned on a case-by-case basis at the pleasure of
the executive. As such, the standard of independence and impartiality that is offered
by many domestic tribunals, although they deal with less weighty matters, surpasses
that of investment treaty tribunals.
Third, and most importantly, where a decision of a domestic tribunal does engage
important questions of general law, the decision can be appealed to an independent
court. This is not the case in investment treaty arbitration, where questions of law
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decided by arbitrators are not subject to review in a court, whether domestic or
international, to assure their correctness or reasonableness.
There are of course other possible counter-arguments. One might argue that, if
adjudicators under investment treaties were required to commit to a lengthy term of
service, states would not be able to attract those with the desired experience or
expertise. This is not a flippant objection and one should not underestimate the
challenge of identifying the best possible candidates for such an important role as
membership on an international investment court. However, considering the
willingness of many prominent judges, practitioners, academics, and officials to
accept appointments as arbitrators in the present system, it seems doubtful that one
would face a shortage of highly qualified persons who were willing to serve, even if it
required them to relinquish income or career opportunities elsewhere. Some would
no doubt decline the opportunity for very understandable reasons, but there would
likely be others to take their place, and they should at least be invited to step forward.
Finally, the system might benefit from widening the pool of recruitment by drawing
on persons with experience and expertise in fields of law and policy beyond those of
international investment or commerce, in light of the breadth of issues that may be
generated by regulatory disputes between business and state.
Another counter-argument might be that the parties should be permitted to choose
an adjudicator or adjudicative process that they believe will better serve to deal with
disputes between them. That is a compelling argument in many contexts where
arbitration is used, as in commercial arbitration, labour arbitration, and perhaps
family arbitration. But in the case of investment treaty arbitration it runs into the first
stage of the case presented here. Regulatory disputes between states and investors
are not disputes between juridical equals. They are a matter of public law, where the
fictional behemoth of the sovereign state has myriad relations with all private parties
within its jurisdiction and affected by its governing choices, and where it is up to the
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institutions of the state to decide on the forms of decision-making and adjudication
that will be made accessible to individuals who wish to challenge the sovereign. In
this context, it is more accurate to say that the state (or states, by treaty) authorized a
particular form of dispute settlement that the individual subsequently opts to take
advantage of, as where a person brings a claim against the state under a domestic
statute or constitution. To reduce such arrangements for public law adjudication to
the conceptual framework of a consensual agreement between disputing parties –
given the singular and over-arching role of the state’s decision to establish the
arrangements as a means to govern the state’s regulatory authority – is artificial.
Along the same lines, it was recently put to the author, following a conference
presentation, that ICSID plays a limited role as an appointing authority because it
appoints the presiding arbitrator in just 3% of cases. I confess to not knowing the
frequency of actual appointments as a proportion of potential appointments by
ICSID. It is firstly not a straightforward figure to calculate. Does one measure ICSID
appointments as a proportion of all presiding arbitrators who take part in arbitrations
that are subject to ICSID appointing authority, for example? Or does one measure
ICSID appointments as a proportion of all appointments in such arbitrations,
including appointments of the party-appointed arbitrators? A further complication is
that awards do not always indicate in the text whether the presiding arbitrator was
appointed by ICSID in the exercise of its compulsory power, or by some other
means.
However, the author tested the figure of 3% in a preliminary way by reviewing
investment treaty awards, decided before 1 September 2006, on which the relevant
data was at hand (ie a statement in the award indicating who appointed the presiding
arbitrator). This yielded these results. Of 26 cases reviewed,25 16 were pursuant to the
Cases pursuant to ICSID Rules: LESI v Algeria (co-arbitrators appointed president); Lanco v
Argentina (SG ICSID appointed president with agreement of parties); Aguas del Aconguija & Vivendi v
Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president); Enron v Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president);
25
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ICSID Rules, and ICSID appointed the presiding arbitrator in 69% of those cases.
The other 10 cases were pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules, and the designated
appointing authority (ICSID in 9 of the 10 cases; Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
in the remaining case) appointed the presiding arbitrator in 40% of those cases. Thus,
even adopting assumptions that understate the role of the appointing authority – by
excluding annulment committees (as did the author in gathering the 26 cases), by
including party-appointed arbitrators in the calculation, and by assuming that all
party-appointed arbitrators were in fact appointed by the relevant party although in
fact they were in a few cases appointed by the appointing authority – then the result
is that ICSID appointed 23% of total arbitrators in ICSID cases, and the designated
appointing authority appointed 19% in ICSID and UNCITRAL cases combined. On
these assumptions and preliminary findings, the figure of 3% appears a significant
underestimate.
Regardless of the frequency of ICSID appointments, a more important point is that
the power of an organization to appoint arbitrators goes beyond the actual exercise of
that appointing authority. Negotiations between the disputing parties about who they
should agree to appoint as president of a tribunal are shaped by their estimation of
how the designated authority will exercise its power to appoint if called upon to do
so. The appointing authority also normally has the power to resolve claims that a
CMS v Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president); LG&E v Argentina (SG ICSID appointed
president with agreement of parties); Siemens v Argentina (Acting SG ICSID appointed president);
Sempra v Argentina (Acting SG ICSID appointed president); AES v Argentina (SG ICSID appointed
president); Continental Casualty v Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president); Gas Natural v Argentina
(Chair of AC appointed president); Plama v Bulgaria (Chair of AC appointed president); Goetz v
Burundi (Chair of AC appointed president); Casado v Chile (Chair of AC appointed president); MTD
Equity v Chile (by agreement); Champion Trading v Egypt (SG ICSID appointed president with
agreement of parties). Cases pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules: Ethyl v Canada (ICSID appointed
president); Pope & Talbot v Canada (SG ICSID appointed president); SD Myers v Canada (by
agreement); Lauder v Czech Republic (by agreement); Saluka v Czech Republic (by agreement of coarbitrators); Swembalt v Latvia (by agreement of co-arbitrators, one party-appointed arbitrator
appointed by SCC Institute on nomination as appointing authority by SG PCA); International
Thunderbird v Mexico (SG ICSID appointed president); Link Trading v Moldova (SCC Institute appointed
president and one party-appointed arbitrator on nomination as appointing authority by SG PCA);
Canfor v US (initial panel by agreement); Consolidated Softwood Lumber v US (SG ICSID appointed all
three members).
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particular arbitrator has a conflict of interest or is otherwise impartial, and ICSID
itself appoints all three members of ICSID annulment committees.
It is thus not convincing to argue that investment treaty arbitrators do not require
security of tenure because the disputing parties often reach agreement on who should
be appointed as presiding arbitrator. Such agreements are reached against the
backdrop of the parties’ perceptions of the probable predilections of those who the
appointing authority would otherwise likely appoint. Indeed, if the role of the
appointing authority was inconsequential, why is such care taken by the major states
to ensure that their treaties assign appointing authority to organizations whose voting
power is dominated by capital-exporting states or by international business? Lastly, it
is indicative of the broader argument that a similar apprehension of perceived bias
has been expressed by representatives of Western firms concerned about the role of
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission as appointing
authority in contract-based arbitrations between foreign firms and state-owned
companies in China.26
A final argument might be to plead a fait d’accompli by arguing that states have made
the choice to use arbitration in this manner, and that is it. This is a profoundly
powerful case where the objective is to interpret and apply the law as it stands. There
may be constitutional limits to the delegation of judicial power to private arbitrators
in some states, and the fact that states have resorted to arbitration to resolve public
law may have implications for the system more broadly, perhaps in terms of the
recognition and enforcement of awards. But there can be little, if any, doubt that the
states parties to investment treaties intended to allow arbitrators who do not have
secure tenure to resolve the relevant disputes. Nevertheless, this does nothing to
undermine the argument presented here given that its object is to explain why states
should not have made, and should not continue to make, this choice. The existing
26
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arrangement does not satisfy standards of judicial impartiality and independence; this
inadequacy can be addressed by establishing an adjudicative body that satisfies those
standards. It is quite clear at this stage what states did; the point is they got it wrong.
Some of these counter-arguments (and there are no doubt others not canvassed here)
are more compelling than others, but none warrants abandonment of the case for an
international investment court. None explains in particular why it is preferable to use
arbitration to resolve investment disputes rather than to ensure the utmost integrity
of adjudicative decision-making in the regulatory domain by incorporating objective
guarantees for judicial independence and impartiality.
C

Conclusion

The skeletal argument presented here is (1) that investment treaty arbitration is a
form of public law adjudication, (2) that it fails to satisfy standards of independence
and impartiality in public law, and (3) that various reasons that might be offered to
justify this are unsatisfactory in light of the importance of these standards. The next
step is to ask: what sort of international investment court is required and how best
should one seek to establish it? There are many possibilities and opportunities. An
international investment court could be multilateral, regional, or bilateral. It could be
a full court or an appellate body court that would hear appeals from decisions made
in the first instance by arbitrators. It could be an autonomous entity or housed within
existing institutions. It could be staffed by dedicated judges or via a roster of jurists
who sit on domestic courts. Ultimately, it is not so important to arrive at a specific
design for an international investment court that suits all states or all commentators.
Much more important is to recognize that the present system is flawed and call upon
states to address this flaw. Ideally, states will act jointly to do so but to the extent that
cooperation proves elusive, like-minded states should not hesitate to pursue
alternatives to investment treaty arbitration with respect to their own treaty networks.
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The critical point is that alternatives should be measured against the criteria of
judging in public law, especially the related concepts of openness and independence.
Without these standards being met, one does not have a system that depoliticizes
disputes and subjects them to the rule of law, or that deserves the respect of all
interested parties, above all developing states. At present, when Argentina or Ecuador
or the Czech Republic is unsuccessful in an investment treaty arbitration, its
government and people have justifiable reason to reject the result as unfair, the
process as structured unfairly against the host state, and the award as inferior in
legitimacy to that of a court decision.
There is clearly an important role for arbitration in contexts outside of public law,
where the concerns elaborated here are much less pertinent. There is also a need for
international adjudication to address concerns arising from domestic regulation of
foreign investment in a global economy and the threat of arbitrary or discriminatory
treatment by host governments. In this respect, it would be beneficial for investors in
general, as well as states, to establish a system that is widely regarded to be free of
perceived bias. And regardless of one’s views about whether there is a sufficient basis
for doubts about the integrity of decisions emanating from the current system, why
risk the possibility of many believing this to be the case? There is a clear alternative
that is achievable, with awareness and political will, and states should be encouraged
to pursue it.
Lastly it is important to reiterate that the argument here is not an indictment of
individual arbitrators. It is more an indictment of those public decision-makers who
have chosen to rely on arbitration in matters of public law. Many arbitrators are
justifiably admired for their integrity. But it is not enough to rely on the personal
reputation of arbitrators when adjudicating public law. As Lord Prosser explained in a
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decision of the English High Court27 that dealt with the appointment of temporary
sheriffs in Scotland by ministerial officials and whether this met the guarantee in the
European Convention on Human Rights of the right to a fair hearing before an
‘independent and impartial tribunal established by law’:
I am not suggesting in any way that there has ever been any impropriety, either
on the part of temporary sheriffs or on the part of any holder of any
ministerial office, or of their officials. But I would add that if a judge is not
independent, then however great his integrity, it may be very difficult for him
to know whether his want of independence affects the way in which he carries
out his judicial duties. And however determined a minister or public servant
may be to carry out his functions in relation to the judiciary only on the basis
of wholly appropriate considerations, it will be important for him to
remember that his own confidence in his own integrity is not, and cannot be
regarded as, a guarantee.
It is with the same sentiment that a case for an international investment court is laid
out here.

Starr v Ruxtom [2000] JC 208, 234 (also cited by Lord Bingham for the Privy Council in Millar v
Dickson [2001] UKPC D4).
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APPOINTMENT AND TENURE OF ADJUDICATORS
RELEVANT PROVISIONS FOR SELECTED INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Regulatory – allows individual claims against state
Adjudicator
European
Court of
Human Rights
– one judge per
High
Contracting
Party (ECHR
Art 22(1)).

Appointment
method
ECHR Art 22(1):
‘The judges shall be
elected by the
Parliamentary
Assembly with
respect to each
High Contracting
Party with by a
majority of votes
cast from a list of
three candidates
nominated by the
High Contracting
Party.’

Qualifications
and attributes
ECHR Art 21(1):
‘The judges shall be
of high moral
character and must
either possess the
qualifications
required for
appointment to
high judicial office
or be jurisconsults
of recognised
competence.’

Duration and
security of tenure
ECHR Art 23 (1):
‘The judges shall be
elected for a period
of six years….’
ECHR Art 23(6):
‘The terms of
office of judges
shall expire when
they reach the age
of 70.’
ECHR Art 24: ‘No
judge may be
dismissed from his
office unless the
other judges decide
by a majority of
two-thirds that he
has ceased to fulfill
the required
conditions.’

Qualities of tenure
ECHR Art 21(3): ‘During
their term of office the
judges shall not engage in
any activity which is
incompatible with their
independence, impartiality
or with the demands of a
full-time office; all questions
arising from the application
of this paragraph shall be
decided by the Court.’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
4: ‘In accordance with
Article 21(3) of the
Convention, the judges shall
not during their term of
office engage in any political
or administrative activity or
any professional activity
which is incompatible with
their independence or
impartiality or with the
demands of a full-time
office. Each judge shall
declare to the President of
the Court any additional
activity. In the event of a
disagreement between the
President and the judge
concerned, any question
arising shall be decided by
the plenary Court.’
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Eligibility for reappointment
ECHR Art 23(1):
‘The judges shall be
elected for a period
of six years. They
may be reelected….’

Method of appointment
to specific cases
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
13: ‘Judges of the Court
may not preside in cases in
which the Contracting Party
of which they are nationals
or in respect of which they
were elected is a party.’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
24(2)(a): ‘The Grand
Chamber shall include the
President and the VicePresidents of the court and
the Presidents of the
Sections….’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
24(2)(e): ‘The judges and
substitute judges who are to
complete the Grand
Chamber in each case
referred to it shall be
designated from among the
remaining judges by a
drawing of lots by the
President of the Court in
the presence of the
Registrar. The modalities
for the drawing of lots shall
be laid down by the Plenary
Court, having due regard to
the need for a
geographically balanced
composition reflected the
different legal systems
among the Contracting
Parties.’

Other provisions
ECHR Art 21(2): ‘The judges
shall sit on the Court in their
individual capacity.’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 3(1):
‘Before taking up office, each
elected judge shall… take the
following oath or make the
following solemn declaration: “I
swear… that I will exercise my
functions as a judge honourably,
independently, and impartially
and that I will keep secret all
deliberations.’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 28(2):
‘A judge may not take part in the
consideration of any case in
which he or she has a personal
interest or has previously acted
either as the Agent, advocate or
adviser of a party or of a person
having an interest in the case, or
as a member of a tribunal or
commission of inquiry, or in any
other capacity.’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 28(4):
‘If the President of the Chamber
considers that a reason exists for
a judge to withdraw, he or she
shall consult with the judge
concerned; in the event of
disagreement, the Chamber shall
decide.’

Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
25(1): ‘The Chambers
provided for in Article 26(b)
of the Convention (referred
to in these Rules as
“Sections”) shall be set up
by the plenary Court, on a
proposal by its President,
for a period of three
years….’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
25(2): ‘Each judge shall be a
member of a Section. The
composition of the Sections
shall be geographically and
gender balanced and shall
reflect the different legal
systems among the
Contracting Parties.’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
26(1): ‘…. (a) … the
Chambers shall in each case
include the President of the
Section and the judge
elected in respect of any
Contracting Party
concerned…. (b) The other
members of the Chamber
shall be designated by the
President of the Section in
rotation from among the
members of the relevant
Section.’
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule
27: ‘1. Committees
composed of three judges
belonging to the same
Section shall be set up….
After consulting the
Presidents of the Sections,
the President of the Court
shall decide on the number
of Committees to set up. 2.
The Committees shall be
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constituted for a period of
twelve months by rotation
among the members of
each Section, excepting the
President of the Section.’
Adjudicator
European
Court of
Justice – one
judge per
Member State
(EU Treaty Art
221)

Appointment
method
EU Treaty Art 223:
‘…. They shall be
appointed by
common accord of
the governments of
the Member
States….’

Qualifications
and attributes
EU Treaty Art 223:
‘The Judges… of
the Court of Justice
shall be chosen
from persons
whose
independence is
beyond doubt and
who possess the
qualifications
required for
appointment to the
highest judicial
offices in their
respective
countries or who
are jurisconsults of
recognised
competence….’

Duration and
security of tenure
EU Treaty Art 223:
‘… they shall be
appointed by
common accord of
the governments of
the Member States
for a term of six
years.’

Qualities of tenure
Statute of the ECJ Art: 4:
‘The Judges may not hold
any political or
administrative office. They
may not engage in any
occupation, whether gainful
or not, unless exemption is
exceptionally granted by the
Council. When taking up
their duties, they shall give a
solemn undertaking that,
both during and after their
term of office, they will
respect the obligations
arising therefrom, in
particular the duty to
behave with integrity and
discretion as regards the
acceptance, after they have
ceased to hold office, of
certain appointments or
benefits. Any doubt on this
point shall be settled by
decision of the Court.’
Code of Conduct of the
ECJ Art 5: ‘Members who
wish to take part in an
external activity shall
request prior authorisation
from the Court or Tribunal
of which they are a
Member. They shall
undertake, however, to
comply with their obligation
to be available so as to
devote themselves fully to
the performance of their
duties.’

3

Eligibility for reappointment
EU Treaty Art 223:
‘Retiring Judges…
may be
reappointed.’

Method of appointment
to specific cases
Rules of Procedure of the
ECJ, Art 6: ‘Judges… shall
rank equally in precedent
according to their seniority
in office. Where there is
equal seniority in office,
precedence shall be
determined by age.’
Rules of Procedure of the
ECJ, Art 11b(1): ‘For each
case the Grand Chamber
shall be composed of the
President of the Court, the
Presidents of the Chambers
of five Judges, the JudgeRapporteur and the number
of Judges necessary to reach
13. The last mentioned
Judges shall be designated
from the list referred to in
paragraph 2, following the
order laid down therein….’
Rules of Procedure of the
ECJ, Art 11b(2): ‘… a list of
the other Judges shall be
drawn up for the purposes
of determining the
composition of the Grand
Chamber. That list shall
follow the order laid down
in Article 6 of these Rules,
alternating with the reverse
order….’
Rules of Procedure of the
ECJ, Art 11c(2): ‘For the
composition of the

Other provisions
Statute of the ECJ Art: 2: ‘Before
taking up his duties each Judge
shall, in open court, take an oath
to perform his duties impartially
and conscientiously and to
preserve the secrecy of all the
deliberations of the Court.’
Statute of the ECJ Art: 6: ‘A
Judge may be deprived of his
office or of his right to a pension
or other benefits in its stead only
if, in the unanimous opinion of
the Judges and Advocates
General of the Court, he no
longer fulfils the requisite
conditions or meets the
obligations arising from his office.
The Judge concerned shall not
take part in any such
deliberations.’
Statute of the ECJ Art: 15: ‘The
Court shall remain permanently in
session. The duration of the
judicial vacations shall be
determined by the Court with due
regard to the needs of its
business.’
Statute of the ECJ Art: 18: ‘No
Judge or Advocate General may
take part in the disposal of any
case in which he has previously
taken part as agent or adviser or
has acted for one of the parties,
or in which he has been called
upon to pronounce as a member
of a court or tribunal, of a

Chambers of five Judges…
those lists shall be drawn up
including all the Judges to
the Chamber concerned….
in the same way as the list
referred to in Article 11b(2).
For the composition of the
Chambers of three
Judges… those Chamber
lists shall be drawn up
including all the Judges
attached to the Chamber
concerned…. The lists shall
be drawn up according to
the order laid down in
Article 6 of these Rules.’

commission of inquiry or in any
other capacity….. If, for some
special reason, the President
considers that any Judge or
Advocate General should not sit
or make submissions in a
particular case, he shall notify him
accordingly. Any difficulty arising
as to the application of this
Article shall be settled by decision
of the Court.’
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art
3: ‘Members shall not accept gifts
of any kind which might call into
question their independence.’
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art
3: ‘Members shall avoid any
situation which may give rise to a
conflict of interest.’

Adjudicator
European
Court of First
Instance – 27
judges (Statute
of the ECJ Art
48; EU Treaty
Art 224)

Appointment
method
EU Treaty Art 223:
‘…. They shall be
appointed by
common accord of
the governments of
the Member
States….’

Qualifications
and attributes
EU Treaty Art 224:
‘The members of
the Court of First
Instance shall be
chosen from
persons whose
independence is
beyond doubt and
who possess the
ability required for
appointment to
high judicial
office….’

Duration and
security of tenure
EU Treaty Art 224:
‘…. They shall be
appointed by
common accord of
the governments of
the Member States
for a term of six
years….’

Qualities of tenure
Statute of the ECJ Art: 4
and 47: ‘The Judges may
not hold any political or
administrative office. They
may not engage in any
occupation, whether gainful
or not, unless exemption is
exceptionally granted by the
Council. When taking up
their duties, they shall give a
solemn undertaking that,
both during and after their
term of office, they will
respect the obligations
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Eligibility for reappointment
EU Treaty Art 224:
‘Retiring members
shall be eligible for
re-appointment.’

Method of appointment
to specific cases
Rules of Procedure of the
Court of First Instance, Art
6: ‘With the exception of
the President of the Court
of First Instance and of the
Presidents of the Chambers,
the Judges shall rank equally
in precedence according to
their seniority in office.
Where there is equal
seniority in office,
precedence shall be
determined by age….’

Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art
6: ‘…. Members shall
undertake…. that, for a period of
three years from the date of their
ceasing to hold office, they will
not act – as representatives of
parties, in either written or oral
pleadings, in cases before the
Community judicature.’
Other provisions
Statute of the ECJ Art: 2 and 47:
‘Before taking up his duties each
Judge shall, in open court, take an
oath to perform his duties
impartially and conscientiously
and to preserve the secrecy of all
the deliberations of the Court.’
Statute of the ECJ Art: 6 and 47:
‘A Judge may be deprived of his
office or of his right to a pension
or other benefits in its stead only
if, in the unanimous opinion of
the Judges and Advocates

arising therefrom, in
particular the duty to
behave with integrity and
discretion as regards the
acceptance, after they have
ceased to hold office, of
certain appointments or
benefits. Any doubt on this
point shall be settled by
decision of the Court.’

Rules of Procedure of the
Court of First Instance, Art
10: ‘The Court of First
Instance shall set up
Chambers of three and of
five Judges and a Grand
Chamber of thirteen Judges
and shall decide which
Judges shall be attached to
them.’

Code of Conduct of the
ECJ Art 5: ‘Members who
wish to take part in an
external activity shall
request prior authorisation
from the Court or Tribunal
of which they are a
Member. They shall
undertake, however, to
comply with their obligation
to be available so as to
devote themselves fully to
the performance of their
duties.’

Rules of Procedure of the
Court of First Instance, Art
12: ‘The Court of First
Instance shall lay down
criteria by which cases are
to be allocated among the
Chambers.’

General of the Court, he no
longer fulfils the requisite
conditions or meets the
obligations arising from his office.
The Judge concerned shall not
take part in any such
deliberations.’
Statute of the ECJ Art: 15 and 47:
‘The Court shall remain
permanently in session. The
duration of the judicial vacations
shall be determined by the Court
with due regard to the needs of its
business.’
Statute of the ECJ Art: 18 and 47:
‘No Judge or Advocate General
may take part in the disposal of
any case in which he has
previously taken part as agent or
adviser or has acted for one of
the parties, or in which he has
been called upon to pronounce as
a member of a court or tribunal,
of a commission of inquiry or in
any other capacity….. If, for
some special reason, the President
considers that any Judge or
Advocate General should not sit
or make submissions in a
particular case, he shall notify him
accordingly. Any difficulty arising
as to the application of this
Article shall be settled by decision
of the Court.’
Statute of the ECJ Art: 52: ‘The
President of the Court of Justice
and the President of the Court of
First Instance shall determine, by
common accord, the conditions
under which officials and other
servants attached to the Court of
Justice shall render their services
to the Court of First Instance to
enable it to function.’
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Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art
3: ‘Members shall not accept gifts
of any kind which might call into
question their independence.’
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art
3: ‘Members shall avoid any
situation which may give rise to a
conflict of interest.’
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art
6: ‘…. Members shall
undertake…. that, for a period of
three years from the date of their
ceasing to hold office, they will
not act – as representatives of
parties, in either written or oral
pleadings, in cases before the
Community judicature.’
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Regulatory – allows state claims against individual
Adjudicator
International
Criminal Court
– at least 18
judges (Rome
Statute Art
36(1)).

Appointment
method
Rome Statute Art
35(1): ‘All judges
shall be elected as
full-time members
of the Court….’
Rome Statute Art
36 (4)(a):
‘Nominations of
candidates for
election to the
Court may be made
by any State Party
to this Statute, and
shall be made
either: (i) By the
procedure for the
nomination of
candidates for
appointment to the
highest judicial
offices in the State
in question; or (ii)
By the procedure
provided for the
nomination of
candidates for the
International Court
of Justice in the
Statute of that
Court.
Nominations shall
be accompanied by
a statement in the
necessary detail
specifying how the
candidate fulfils the
requirements of
paragraph 3.’
Rome Statute Art

Qualifications
and attributes
Rome Statute Art
36(3)(a): ‘The
judges shall be
chosen from
among persons of
high moral
character,
impartiality and
integrity who
possess the
qualifications
required in their
respective States
for appointment to
the highest judicial
offices.’
Rome Statute Art
36(3)(b): ‘Every
candidate for
election to the
Court shall: (i)
Have established
competence in
criminal law and
procedure, and the
necessary relevant
experience,
whether as judge,
prosecutor,
advocate or in
other similar
capacity in criminal
proceedings; or (ii)
Have established
competence in
relevant areas of
international law
such as
international
humanitarian law

Duration and
security of tenure
Rome Statute Art
36(9)(a): ‘… judges
shall hold office for
a term of nine
years….’
Rome Statute Art
46(1): ‘A judge…
shall be removed
from office if a
decision to this
effect is made in
accordance with
paragraph 2, in
cases where that
person: (a) Is
found to have
committed serious
misconduct or a
serious breach of
his or her duties
under this
Statute…; or (b) Is
unable to exercise
the functions
required by this
Statute.’
Rome Statute Art
46(2): ‘A decision
as to the removal
from office of a
judge… shall be
made by the
Assembly of State
Parties, by secret
ballot:: (a) In the
case of a judge, by
a two-thirds
majority of the
States Parties upon

Qualities of tenure
Rome Statute Art 35(1): ‘All
judges shall be elected as
full-time members of the
Court and shall be available
to serve on that basis from
the commencement of their
terms.’
Rome Statute Art 35(3):
‘The Presidency may, on the
basis of the workload of the
Court and in consultation
with its members, decide
from time to time to what
extent the remaining judges
shall be required to serve on
a full-time basis….’
Rome Statute Art 40(1):
‘The judges shall be
independent in the
performance of their
functions.’
Rome Statute Art 40(2):
‘Judges shall not engage in
any activity which is likely
to interfere with their
judicial functions or to
affect confidence in their
independence.’
Rome Statute Art 40(3):
‘Judges required to serve on
a full-time basis at the seat
of the Court shall not
engage in any other
occupation of a professional
nature.’
Rome Statute Art 40(4):
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Eligibility for reappointment
Rome Statute Art
36(9)(a): ‘… judges
shall… not be
eligible for reelection.’

Method of appointment
to specific cases
Rome Statute Art 39(1): ‘As
soon as possible after the
election of the judges, the
Court shall organize itself
into the divisions
specified…. The assignment
of judges to divisions shall
be based on the nature of
the functions to be
performed by each division
and the qualifications and
experience of the judges
elected to the Court, in such
a way that each division
shall contain an appropriate
combination of expertise in
criminal law and procedure
and in international law.
The Trial and Pre-Trial
Divisions shall be
composed predominantly of
judges with criminal trial
experience.’

Other provisions
Rome Statute Art 41(2)(a): ‘A
judge shall not participate in any
case in which his or her
impartiality might reasonably be
doubted on any ground. A judge
shall be disqualified from a case in
accordance with this paragraph if,
inter alia, that judge has
previously been involved in any
capacity in that case before the
Court or in a related criminal case
at the national level involving the
person being investigated or
prosecuted….’
Rome Statute Art 41(2)(c): ‘Any
question as to the disqualification
of a judge shall be decided by an
absolute majority of the judges.
The challenged judge shall be
entitled to present his or her
comments on the matter, but
shall not take part in the decision.’
Rome Statute Art 45: ‘Before
taking up their respective duties
under this Statute, the judges…
shall each make a solemn
undertaking in open court to
exercise his or her respective
functions impartially and
conscientiously.’
Rome Statute Art 49: ‘The
judges… shall receive such
salaries, allowances and expenses
as may be decided upon by the
Assembly of States Parties. These
salaries and allowances shall not
be reduced during their terms of
office.’

36(4)(b): ‘Each
State Party may put
forward one
candidate for any
given election….’
Rome Statute Art
36(4)(c): ‘The
Assembly of State
Parties may decide
to establish, if
appropriate, an
Advisory
Committee on
nominations. In
that event, the
Committee’s
composition and
mandate shall be
established by the
Assembly of State
Parties.’
Rome Statute Art
36(6)(a): ‘The
judges shall be
elected by secret
ballot at a meeting
of the Assembly of
States Parties
convened for that
purpose….’

and the law of
human rights, and
extensive
experience in a
professional legal
capacity which is
relevant to the
judicial work of the
Court.’
Rome Statute Art
36(4)(b): ‘Each
State Party may put
forward one
candidate for any
given election who
need not
necessarily be a
national of that
State Party but
shall in any case by
a national of a State
Party.’
Rome Statute Art
36(7): ‘No two
judges may be
nationals of the
same State….’

a recommendation
by a two-thirds
majority of the
other judges….’
Rome Statute Art
47: ‘A judge… who
has committed
misconduct of a
less serious
nature… shall be
subject to
disciplinary
measures….’
Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of
the ICC, Rule 31:
‘Once removal
from office has
been pronounced,
it shall take effect
immediately. The
person concerned
shall cease to form
part of the Court,
including for
unfinished cases in
which he or she
was taking part.’

‘Any question regarding the
application of paragraphs 2
and 3 shall be decided by an
absolute majority of the
judges. Where any such
question concerns an
individual judge, that judge
shall not take part in the
decision.’
Code of Judicial Ethics of
the ICC, Art 10(1): ‘Judges
shall not engage in any
extra-judicial activity that is
incompatible with their
judicial function or the
efficient and timely
functioning of the Court, or
that may affect or may
reasonably appear to affect
their independence and
impartiality.
Code of Judicial Ethics of
the ICC, Art 10(2): ‘Judges
shall not exercise any
political function.’

Rome Statute Art
36(8)(a): ‘The
States Parties shall,
in the selection of
judges, take into
account the need,
within the
membership of the
Court, for: (i) The
representation of
the principal legal
systems of the
world; (ii)
Equitable
geographical
representation; and
(iii) A fair

Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the ICC, Rule 34: ‘In addition
to the grounds set out… the
grounds for disqualification of a
judge… shall include, inter alia,
the following: (a) Personal interest
in the case…; (b) Involvement, in
his or her private capacity, in any
legal proceedings… in which the
person being investigated or
prosecuted was or is an opposing
party; (c) Performance of
functions, prior to taking office,
during which he or she could be
expected to have formed an
opinion…; (d) Expression of
opinions, through the
communications media, in writing
or in public actions, that,
objectively, could adversely affect
the required impartiality of the
person concerned.’
Code of Judicial Ethics of the
ICC, Art 3(1): ‘Judges shall
uphold the independence of their
office and the authority of the
Court and shall conduct
themselves accordingly in carrying
out their judicial functions.’
Code of Judicial Ethics of the
ICC, Art 3(2): ‘Judges shall not
engage in any activity which is
likely to interfere with their
judicial functions or to affect
confidence in their
independence.’
Code of Judicial Ethics of the
ICC, Art 4(1): ‘Judges shall be
impartial and ensure the
appearance of impartiality in the
discharge of their judicial
functions.’
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Code of Judicial Ethics of the
ICC, Art 4(2): ‘Judges shall avoid
any conflict of interest, or being
placed in a situation which might
reasonably be perceived as giving
rise to a conflict of interest.’

representation of
female and male
judges.’
Rome Statute Art
36(8)(b): ‘States
Parties shall also
take into account
the need to include
judges with legal
expertise on
specific issues,
including, but not
limited to, violence
against women and
children.’

Code of Judicial Ethics of the
ICC, Art 5(1): ‘Judges shall
conduct themselves with probity
and integrity in accordance with
their office, thereby enhancing
public confidence in the
judiciary.’
Code of Judicial Ethics of the
ICC, Art 5(2): ‘Judges shall not
directly or indirectly accept any
gift, advantage, privilege or
reward that can reasonably be
perceived as being intended to
influence the performance of
their judicial functions.’
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Reciprocal – limited to inter-state disputes
Adjudicator
International
Court of
Justice – 15
judges (ICJ
Statute Art
3(1)).

Appointment
method
ICJ Statute Art 4:
‘The members of
the Court shall be
elected by the
General Assembly
and by the Security
Council from a list
of persons
nominated by the
national groups in
the Permanent
Court of
Arbitration…’
ICJ Statute Art 8:
‘The General
Assembly and the
Security Council
shall proceed
independently of
one another to
elect the members
of the Court.’
ICJ Statute Art 10:
‘1. Those
candidates who
obtain an absolute
majority of votes in
the General
Assembly and in
the Security
Council shall be
considered as
elected. 2. Any vote
of the Security
Council, whether
for the election of
judges or…, shall
be taken without
any distinction

Qualifications
and attributes
ICJ Statute Art 2:
‘The Court shall be
composed of a
body of
independent
judges, elected
regardless of their
nationality from
among persons of
high moral
character, who
possess the
qualifications
required in their
respective
countries for
appointment to the
highest judicial
offices, or are
jurisconsults of
recognized
competence in
international law.’

Duration and
security of tenure
ICJ Statute Art
13(1): ‘The
members of the
Court shall be
elected for nine
years….’
ICJ Statute Art
18(1): ‘No member
of the Court can be
dismissed unless, in
the unanimous
opinion of the
other members, he
has ceased to fulfill
the required
conditions.’

Qualities of tenure
ICJ Statute Art 16: ‘1. No
member of the Court may
exercise any political or
administrative function, or
engage in any other
occupation of a professional
nature. 2. Any doubt on this
point shall be settled by the
decision of the Court.’
ICJ Statute Art 23(3):
‘Members of the Court shall
be bound, unless they are
on leave or prevented from
attending by illness or other
serious reasons duly
explained to the President,
to hold themselves
permanently at the disposal
of the Court.’

ICJ Statute Art
3(1): ‘The Court
shall consist of
fifteen members,
no two of whom
may be nationals of
the same state.’
ICJ Statute Art 9:
‘At every election,
the electors shall
bear in mind not
only that the
persons to be
elected should
individually possess
the qualifications

Eligibility for reappointment
ICJ Statute Art
13(1): ‘The
members of the
Court… may be reelected….’

Method of appointment
to specific cases
ICJ Statute Art 26: ‘1. The
Court may from time to
time form on or more
chambers, composed of
three or more judges as the
Court may determine…. 2.
The Court may at any time
form a chamber for dealing
with a particular case. The
number of judges to
constitute such a chamber
shall be determined by the
Court with the approval of
the parties.’
Rules of the Court, Art
18(1): ‘Elections to all
Chambers shall take place
by secret ballot. The
Members of the Court
obtaining the largest
number of votes
constituting a majority of
the Members of the Court
composing it at the time of
the election shall be
declared elected.’

Other provisions
ICJ Statute Art 17: ‘1. No
member of the Court may act as
agent, counsel, or advocate in any
case…. 3. Any doubt on this
point shall be settled by the
decision of the Court.’
ICJ Statute Art 20: ‘Every
member of the Court shall, before
taking up his duties, make a
solemn declaration in open court
that he will exercise his powers
impartially and conscientiously.’
ICJ Statute Art 23(1): ‘The Court
shall remain permanently in
session, except during the judicial
vacations, the dates and duration
of which shall be fixed by the
Court.’
ICJ Statute Art 24: “…. 2. If the
President considers that for some
special reason one of the
members of the Court should not
sit in a particular case, he shall
give him notice accordingly. 3. If
in any such case the member of
the Court and the President
disagree, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the
Court.’
ICJ Statute Art 32: ‘1. Each
member of the Court shall receive
an annual salary…. 5. These
salaries, allowances, and
compensation shall be fixed by
the General Assembly. They may
not be decreased during the term
of office…. 7. Regulations made
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between permanent
and nonpermanent
members of the
Security Council.
3….’

Adjudicator
WTO
Appellate Body
– seven
members, of
whom three
serve on any
one case (DSU
Art 17(1)).

WTO panels –
three members
unless parties
agree to have
five (DSU Art
8(5)).

Appointment
method
DSU Art 17(2):
‘The DSB shall
appoint persons to
serve on the
Appellate Body….’

NA

required, but also
that in the body as
a whole the
representation of
the main forms of
civilization and of
the principal legal
systems of the
world should be
assured.’
Qualifications
and attributes
DSU Art 17(3)
‘The Appellate
Body shall
comprise persons
of recognized
authority, with
demonstrated
expertise in law,
international trade
and the subject
matter of the
covered
agreements
generally....’
DSU Art 17(3):
‘…. The Appellate
Body membership
shall be broadly
representative of
membership in the
WTO….’
DSU Art 8(1) –
‘Panels shall be
composed of wellqualified
governmental
and/or nongovernmental
individuals,
including persons
who have served
on or presented a
case to a panel,
served as a

by the General Assembly shall fix
the conditions under which
retirement pensions may be given
to members of the Court….’

Duration and
security of tenure
DSU Art 17(2):
‘The DSB shall
appoint persons to
serve on the
Appellate Body for
a four-year term…
However, the
terms of three of
the seven persons
appointed
immediately after
the entry into force
of the WTO
Agreement shall
expire at the end of
two years, to be
determined by lot.
Vacancies shall be
filled as they
arise….’

Qualities of tenure

NA

NA

DSU Art 17(3): ‘…. All
persons serving on the
Appellate Body shall be
available at all times and on
short notice, and shall stay
abreast of dispute
settlement activities and
other relevant activities of
the WTO. They shall not
participate in the
consideration of any
disputes that would create a
direct or indirect conflict of
interest.’

Eligibility for reappointment
DSU Art 17(2):
‘The DSB shall
appoint persons to
serve on the
Appellate Body for
a four-year term,
and each person
may be
reappointed
once….’

Method of appointment
to specific cases
DSU Art 17(1): ‘…. Persons
serving on the Appellate
Body shall serve in rotation.
Such rotation shall be
determined in the working
procedures of the Appellate
Body.’

Other provisions

NA

DSU Art 8(6): ‘The
Secretariat shall propose
nominations for the panel
to the parties to the dispute.
The parties to the dispute
shall not oppose
nominations except for
compelling reasons.’

DSU Art 8(2) ‘Panel members
should be selected with a view to
ensuring the independence of the
members, a sufficiently diverse
background and a wide spectrum
of experience.’

DSU Art 8(7): ‘If there is no
agreement on the panelists
within 20 days after the date
of the establishment of a
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DSU Art 17(3): ‘The Appellate
Body shall comprise persons…
unaffiliated with any
government….’
DSU Art 17(3) ‘They shall not
participate in the consideration of
any disputes that would create a
direct or indirect conflict of
interest.’

DSU Art 8(3): Citizens of
Members whose governments are
parties to the dispute or third
parties… shall not serve on a
panel concerned with that
dispute, unless the parties to the

panel, at the request of
either party, the DirectorGeneral, in consultation
with the Chairman of the
DSB and the Chairman of
the relevant Council or
Committee, shall determine
the composition of the
panel by appointing the
panelists whom the
Director-General considers
most appropriate…, after
consulting with the parties
to the dispute….’

representative of a
Member or of a
contracting party to
GATT 1947 or as a
representative to
the Council or
Committee of any
covered agreement
or its predecessor
agreement, or in
the Secretariat,
taught or published
on international
trade law or policy,
or served as a
senior trade policy
official of a
Member.’

dispute agree otherwise.’
DSU Art 8(4): ‘To assist in the
selection of panelists, the
Secretariat shall maintain an
indicative list of governmental
and non-governmental individuals
possessing the qualifications
outlined in paragraph 1, from
which panelists may be drawn as
appropriate…. Members may
periodically suggest names of
governmental and nongovernmental individuals for
inclusion on the indicative list….’
DSU Art 8(9): ‘Panelists shall
serve in their individual capacities
and not as government
representatives, nor as
representatives of any
organization. Members shall
therefore not give them
instructions nor seek to influence
them as individuals with regard to
matters before a panel.’

DSU Art 8(10):
‘When a dispute is
between a
developing country
Member and a
developed country
Member the panel
shall, if the
developing country
Member so
requests, include at
least one panelist
from a developing
country Member.’

DSU Art 9(3) ‘If more than one
panel is established to examine
the complaints related to the
same matter, to the greatest
extent possible the same persons
shall serve as panelists on each of
the separate panels and the
timetable for the panel process in
such disputes shall be
harmonized.’ – see CME/ Lauder

Decision on
Certain DS
Procedures for the
GATS Art 3:
‘Panels shall be
composed of wellqualified
governmental
and/or nongovernmental
individuals who
have experience in
issues related to the
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General Agreement
on Trade in
Services and/or
trade in services,
including
associated
regulatory
matters…..
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